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Abstract
With the help of a simple Ricardian model, this paper explores the role of
industrial policy in self-enforcing trade agreements. A ﬁr s tp a r ts h o w st h a t
the optimal self-enforcing trade agreement includes subsidies to ineﬃcient,
import-competing sectors. Second, when by some exogenous or endogenous
force the comparative advantage deepens, subsidies go to declining industries.
Key assumptions driving these results are: essentiality of imported goods and
ah i g hﬂexibility of the countries’ industrial structure. A ﬁnal part relaxes the
latter assumption and shows that under rigid industrial structures subsidies
favoring import competing sectors actually destabilize trade agreements.
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The achievements of trade liberalization in recent decades notwithstanding, gov-
ernments across the globe continue to spend huge sums to promote comparatively
disadvantaged and declining industries. While policymakers like to justify such ac-
tions by appealing to the strategic value of the industries in question, economists,
concerned about eﬃciency, tend to discard these claims and blame interest groups
for incurring deadweight losses. The present paper argues that under a some pre-
conditions the protection of ineﬃcient and declining sectors may indeed be welfare
improving. It shows that active industrial policy constitutes an eﬃcient way to
make countries respect trade agreements and is therefore part of optimal trade
agreements.
To frame the case, a two-country model of repeated trade is developed1.K e y t o
the model is the self-enforcement requirement, which international agreements need
to satisfy. This assumption reﬂects that sovereign countries cannot be forced into
international cooperation but respect only those agreements that appear beneﬁcial
to them. Now it is well known that large countries have an incentive to cheat
on free trade agreements by unilaterally erecting trade barriers, thereby reaping
gains via improved terms of trade. Countries refrain from doing so only in presence
o ft h ec r e d i b l et h r e a to fab r e a k d o w no fc o o p e r a t i o nt h a tw o u l df o l l o wu n i l a t e r a l
defections. A trade war with uncooperative actions from all countries constitutes
such a credible punishment. Forward-looking governments weigh the transitional
gains from defection against future losses from trade war. Trade agreements, which
all members voluntarily choose to respect are said to be self-enforcing.
When temptation to defect on free trade grows too strong, free trade ceases to be
self-enforcing. Yet there is remedy in this situation, too. It is well understood
that countries can use trade barriers in order to reduce foreign defection incentives.
Previous literature has focused on the use of tariﬀs as such instruments. The present
paper analyzes the case where governments set, in addition to tariﬀs, subsidies to
reduce foreign defection incentives and optimally choose an eﬃcient mix of both.
The paper shows that when imported goods are essential, subsidies are always part
of the constrained optimal trade agreement. Intuitively, the more a country is
vulnerable to hostile foreign trade policy, the more defecting trade partners can
1The conceptual framework relies on Dixit (1987), the model’s formal structure follows Devereux
(1997) who in turn strongly builds on Kennan and Riezman (1988).
1gain and the stronger are their temptations to defect. The importer’s vulnerability
and the exporter’s incentive to cheat are two sides of the same coin. In order to
reduce foreign defection incentives a country that imports essential goods optimally
chooses not to rely entirely on imports but produces some of its imported goods at
home. Finally, since local production is not internationally competitive the domestic
production of imported goods requires subsidies.
A ﬁrst extension of the model introduces a simple form of learning by doing within
sectors and provides a rationale for the protection of declining industries. The ex-
tension starts from the above statement that subsidies to import-competing sectors
are part of optimal trade agreements. When the pattern of comparative advantage
deepens, the value of cooperation increases relative to the value of defection and the
self-enforcement constraint is relaxed, which in turn leads to a reduction of tariﬀs
and subsidies. Trade liberalization is gradual, since anticipated future gains from
cooperation relax the present’s self-enforcement constraint and allow a partial liber-
alization today already. Thus, during the liberalization process, initially protected
sectors slowly shrink due to less and less protection. The reason for such gradual
liberalization does not stem from the desire to cushion incomes or avoid political re-
sistance - it is an optimal policy to run along the path of a binding self-enforcement
constraint.
A second extension severely qualiﬁes and partially reverses the basic ﬁndings. It
introduces rigidities in industrial structure, considering a world where production
capacities take time to build and output patterns are slow to change, so that coun-
tries depend on imports even after trade agreements break down. This extension of
the dependence on imports beyond the period of defection implies that any defec-
tion is followed by a particularly tough trade war. Under such harsh punishment
of defection, mutual dependence now proves to be beneﬁcial. In fact, the deliberate
creation of dependence constitutes a way to commit to free trade, making free trade
more likely to be self-enforceable. In this scenario, subsidies to import competing
sectors can undermine the commitment device and make cooperation harder.
Up to very recently, economic theory has widely neglected the role of subsidies in
trade agreements - despite their prominent role in international trade negotiations.
Bagwell and Staiger (2004) and (2006) address this issue for the ﬁrst time, con-
cluding that a ban on all subsidies may go too far and the strict "WTO subsidy
rules may ultimately do more harm than good to the multilateral trading system".
2The present paper conditionally conﬁrms this ﬁnding in the scenario where the self-
enforcement is the prime constraint in trade negotiations. It further shows that
subsidies optimally go to comparatively disadvantaged sectors, which is broadly
consistent with empirical work on protection and trade policy: Lee and Swagel
(1997) write that "nations tend to protect industries that are weak, in decline, [...]
or threatened by import competition". Treﬂer’s (1993) estimates show that a higher
import-penetration is associated with greater protection, and Goldberg and Maggi
(1999) ﬁnd that "within the group of non-organized sectors, protection tends to
increase with import penetration". The theory of trade agreements typically views
protectionism as the outcome of political activity and lobbying in particular. Rodrik
(1995) provides an overview of this literature. He claims, however, that "we lack a
good explanation of the universal preference for trade restricting policies over trade
promoting ones". Political economy has diﬃculties in justifying this anti-trade bias
in trade policies and previous explanations addressing the issue are scarce and rely
on rather speciﬁc assumptions (see Limao and Panagariya (2002)). The present
paper takes a diﬀerent route and argues that an anti-trade bias may be precisely
what welfare-maximizing governments optimally do to grant that trade agreements
are self-enforcing.
The remainder of the paper contains ﬁve sections. Section 2 develops the basic
model of non-cooperative trade. Section 3 then considers repeated trade and coop-
erative behavior, highlights the role of the self-enforcement constraint, and presents
the basic ﬁnding of the paper. Section 4 introduces learning by doing to explain
gradualism and the protection of declining industries, while section 5 introduces
rigidities in the industrial structure of the countries. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 The Basic Model
There are two countries, Home and Foreign (Foreign variables denoted by ∗ ), which
produce two goods x, y with a constant returns to scale technologies and labor
as the single factor. Countries have equal size of labor force, normalized to unity:
L = L∗ =1 . Assume that Home’s (Foreign’s) productivity in x-( y-) production
equals b while its productivity in the y-( x-) production is equal to 1.W i t hb>1,
t h i sm e a n st h a tH o m ei st h en a t u r a le x p o r t e ro fx. Technologies are disembodied
3and, for a start, exogenous:







Each period, consumers enjoy the momentary utility (simply called utility in the




There is no capital and no saving technology so that, at every point in time, in-
dividuals maximize (2) subject to their momentary budget constraint. Markets
are competitive and only subject to distortions from government policies speciﬁed
below.
Notice that the countries are entirely symmetric and the analysis of the model will
concentrate on symmetric equilibria throughout the paper.
The Integrated Economy and Free Trade
The integrated economy is a world where goods and factors can cross borders with-
out costs. In this world symmetry implies that relative price of goods equals unity
(px/py =1 ). All goods are produced competitively using the most eﬃcient tech-
nology available, i.e. productivity in both sectors is b. Normalizing world price px
to one, individuals face the budget constraint cx + cy ≤ I = b, which implies that
utility of a representative consumer in either of the two countries is
u
F = b/2. (3)
This utility level reﬂects the eﬃcient outcome of the integrated economy. It is
replicated by a world economy where trade in goods is free and costless but factors
- that is labor - is bound to stay within national borders. In this world of free trade
there is complete international specialization, the relative price is unity, and citizens
enjoy utility (3).
Yet, countries have an incentive to distort the world economy by erecting trade
barriers and thereby manipulate the terms of trade to their favor. These incentives
will be analyzed next.
2To save notation, here and whenever there is no risk of confusion time indices are dropped.
4Trade War
When two large countries cannot commit to free trade, they will try to manipulate
t h et e r m so ft r a d et ot h e i rf a v o r .T h er e s u l ti sat r a d ew a rw i t ht y p i c a l l ya l ls i d e s
loosing - the tariﬀ game is subject to a classical prisoner’s dilemma. The present
paper’s symmetric model is no exception: the net eﬀects of the terms of trade
manipulation entirely cancel out and the world economy is left with the distortions
only.
Throughout the paper the government of each country is assumed to employ two
policy instruments, import tariﬀs and production subsidies, in order to maximize
their citizens utility. The gross ad valorem import tariﬀs T and T∗ drive a wedge
between local and international prices of the imported goods. Throughout the
paper, world price of good x is normalized to one and world price of good y will be
called p. This means that local prices are pHome
x =1 , pHome




Independently of tariﬀs, governments hand out production subsidies to one or both
sectors. These subsidies are assumed to generate a minimum output of the target
sector, e.g. Home’s government subsidizes y-production up to the level ¯ y,i nw h i c h













if pHome = b
if pHome >b .
Notice that the subsidized level ¯ y is assumed to be independent of relative prices.
The actual design of the subsidy may be thought of as a price guarantee the govern-
ment gives a set of ﬁrms and which applies up to the target quantity ¯ y. Alternatively,
the government hands out per unit subsidies up to the targeted quantity ¯ y and dis-
tributes these randomly among competitive ﬁrms.3 In either case the aggregate
eﬀect of this policy is a minimum output level in the relevant sector. Abusing ter-





∗, ¯ y∗) will be simply
referred to as subsidies.
3Notice that positive proﬁts might accrue in such a scenario. This is irrelevant for the present
paper’s results since income distribution does not aﬀect aggregate demand in case of homothetic
preferences.
5The Timing
Tariﬀs and subsidies obviously impact the countries’ production structure. How
exactly policies aﬀect decentralized production depends on the timing of events.
Throughout the paper I assume that within a period all decisions concerning pro-
duction are taken simultaneously — i.e. governments ﬁxt a r i ﬀs and subsidies while
ﬁrms make output decision at the same time. Once these supply side decisions are
taken, goods are traded and individuals consume.
In equilibrium ﬁrms take governments decisions as given and consequently, when
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{1 − ¯ x
b}
if pT < b
if pT = b












if pT < b
if pT = b












if bp/T∗ > 1
if bp/T∗ =1





{b(1 − ¯ x∗)}
[¯ y∗,b(1 − ¯ x∗)]
{¯ y∗}
if bp/T∗ > 1
if bp/T∗ =1
if bp/T∗ < 1.
(4)
When deciding on tariﬀs and subsidies, government are assumed to maximize their
citizens’ utility (2). The next step is to derive an expression for the equilibrium
utility and to compute the individually optimal policies.
The costs of subsidies are covered by lump-sum taxes and tariﬀ revenues are dis-
tributed in a lump sum way. Thus, Home’s per capita income equals its average
income which is I = x + pTy +( T − 1)p(cy − y). Expenditure shares are constant
and one half (pTcy = cx = I/2)s ot h a tH o m e ’ si n c o m et a k e st h ef o r m
I =( x + py)
2T
T +1










Note that in the case of symmetry (the important one in the following) relative
prices are one (p =1 ), so that




6This equation reveals that, not surprisingly, globally optimal policies are unique
and consist of no distortions at all (T =1¯ y =0 , ¯ x = b), which implies complete
specialization (x = b, y =0 ). In this case (5) equals (3). But it will become clear
shortly that the Nash Equilibrium generates other outcomes.







a n dw i t ht h et r a d eb a l a n c ex−cx = p(cy−y) one solves for the world price for good
y
p =
x∗T∗(T +1 )+x(T∗ +1 )
yT(T∗ +1 )+y∗(T +1 )
. (6)
When setting their policies, Home’s and Foreign’s governments take into account
their impact on world prices (6). In particular, governments use tariﬀsa n ds u b s i -
dies to distort world prices to their favor with the ultimate goal to maximize their











where Foreign’s tariﬀs and production structures are taken as given. The optimality






x∗ + x(1 + 1/T∗)
y∗ + y(T∗ +1 )
. (8)











N =1 /(b+1)(see Appendix) so that the full Nash Equilib-
4These equations constitute an extension of the results in Kennan and Riezman (1988). See
appendix for a proof of (8).
7rium is characterized by the strategies
_
y
N =1 /(b +1 )
_
x
N =0 TN = b
_
x
∗N =1 /(b +1 )
_
y
∗N =0 T∗N = b.
(10)




(b +1 ) 2
√
b. (11)
Expression (11) reﬂects the utility of citizens living in a world where governments
non-cooperatively choose import tariﬀs, exploiting their market power in the world
market. The respective market power is smaller, the less foreigners are vulnerable to
domestic tariﬀ setting. Consequently, in order to be less exposed to tariﬀs, foreigners
produce some of their import good domestically. Overall, tariﬀsm a yt h u sb es a i d
to represent the oﬀensive part of the trade policy by which countries try to change
the terms of trade, while subsidies reﬂe c tad e f e n s i v em o v et h a ts h i e l d sc o u n t r i e s
from foreign actions. Both policies distort the economy and induce eﬃciency losses.
To sum up this section’s main result, countries engage in distorting policies to
improve their terms of trade, but these attempts mutually neutralize and the sole
eﬀects are utility losses on all sides. The governments’ game is subject to a prisoners’
dilemma and as such the ineﬃciencies can be cured through reputation building in a
repeated game. Inﬁnite repetition of the stage game described above is the subject
of the next section.
3 Repeated Trade and Cooperation
The previous section has shown that in a one-shot trade game countries are tempted
to reap gains by charging tariﬀs unilaterally. Yet, in a repeated game, such actions
can be prevented when they come at the cost of future cooperation. Following
standard assumptions, transitional gains from defection are supposed to come at
the cost of a breakdown of trust and future cooperation. If the threat from future
trade war is severe enough, free trade is dynamically optimal and said to be self-
enforcing. If countries heavily discount future utility, however, this is not the case.
In such a situation, it is possible to sustain some degree of, though not complete
trade liberalization. In this case the natural question arises which of the trade
8barriers should be removed preferably and which should stay to keep agreements
self-enforcing. This section explores the eﬃcient mix of tariﬀs and subsidies that
induces the least distortions while keeping the trade agreement sustainable. The
next part prepares the ground and illustrates the conditions under which free trade
is self-enforcing. Later, these conditions will be assumed to be violated and the
optimal mix of policy functions is analyzed.
Sustaining Free Trade
Assume that the one-shot trade game of the previous section is repeated inﬁnitely
often. Let β be the factor the two countries discount the ﬂow of utilities (2) with
and consider the following strategies. Both countries do not charge tariﬀs and do
not engage in subsidies (T = T∗ =1and y = x∗ =0 ) as long as both did so in every
period in the past. If one country defects and deviates from this pattern the other
cannot react in the same period. Following the period of defection, however, both
countries will play Nash strategies, receiving the Nash utility (11). Under these
assumptions cooperation is self-enforcing if at each time s the future discounted




















is satisﬁed where, uC
t stands for the cooperation utility, uN
t for the Nash utility
(11), and uD
t for defection utility. Inequality (12) represent the self-enforcement
constraints (SEC) and plays a central role in the following analysis. The present
section’s main objective is to explore when it binds and how to use tariﬀsa n d
subsidies optimally to satisfy the SEC.
A good starting point of the analysis are the conditions under which free trade is
self-enforceable in a time-invariant game. Under time-invariance the time-indices of
utilities can be dropped and conditions (12) are equivalent to
β ≥
uD − uC
uD − uN . (13)
Observe that utilities under cooperation and under trade war are as speciﬁes by (3)
and (11), respectively. To derive the defection utility uD recall that not only the
foreign country’s government but also ﬁrms worldwide are taken by surprise when
the local government deviates to oﬀ-equilibrium policies. Just like foreign tariﬀsa n d
subsidies, domestic and foreign ﬁrms cannot respond to the change before the next
9period and output patterns are ﬁxed within the period of defection. Adopting the
terminology from above (i.e. identifying subsidies with the output levels) a deviating
government defects on tariﬀs only and not on subsidies. Thus, to compute uD one
takes the limit x∗ → 0 in (5) under prices (6) and the best response tariﬀ (8) while
setting T∗ =1and y =0 . These computations deliver to the defection utility
uD = b/
√







holds. Note with the expression of the Nash utility (11) that uN/b is decreasing in b
a n ds oi st h ee x p r e s s i o no nt h er i g h to f( 1 4 ) .A st h ed i ﬀerences in productivity grow
larger, the more likely free trade is sustainable, since an increase in b makes the
value of cooperation grow faster than the value of defection. Intuitively, an increase
in b raises world productivity uniformly across secotrs but productivity of a single
country only partially. This biased productivity growth on a country level increases
dependence on imports and trade wars become tougher. Consequently, the rise in
b increases the trade war utility relatively less that it increases cooperation utility
and since ﬁnally the value of defection is a composite of the instantaneous gains and
the following trade war, the rise in b makes cooperation relatively more attractive,
thus relaxing the self-enforcement constraint. This mechanism will play a central
role in Section 4.
Whenever countries heavily discount future utility, condition (14) is violated - the
threat of a trade war does not suﬃce to discipline the countries to respect free
trade. For the rest of the paper this will be assumed to be the case 5.I t i s w e l l
understood that when free trade is not self-enforcing, it is nevertheless possible to
sustain a limited degree of cooperation. In the framework of the present paper with
two policy instruments - tariﬀs and subsidies - the natural question arises which
of them should be reduced to what extend. This question will be addressed in the
following paragraphs.
5Seeking remedy from this ineﬃciency, some scholars follow Dixit (1987) and assume autarky
as a harsher threat which also constitutes a Nash equilibrium. This change makes cooperation on
free trade more likely but does not guarantee it. The results below do not depend on the choice
of (11) as the threat.
10Sustaining Constrained Trade Agreements
Assume that countries are impatient so that (14) is violated and free trade is not
self-enforcing. In this case, starting from the trade war level, a partial reduction of
tariﬀs and subsidies is still self-enforcing. The idea is to keep small amounts of trade
barriers to reduce incentives to defect, making such limited cooperation possible6.
The ineﬃciencies these policies create are the price to pay for avoiding larger losses
of a trade war. To compute the optimal policies denote the tariﬀ and subsidies






A,a n dTA. The optimal static, symmetric,










































A refer to Home’s subsidies of the import and export
sectors, respectively, while formally Foreign’s utility and constraint is absent. By
symmetry of the setup, however, the solution of (15) maximizes both countries’
utility subject to both constraints. The eﬃcient, symmetric, time-invariant trade






A,TA) that solve (15).
Cooperation utility is uC =( xA + yA)
√
TA/(TA +1 )according to (5) and the
uncooperative outcome of trade war is again the Nash utility uN from (11). To
compute Home’s defection utility uD note that the arguments of uD are the co-
operation policies that are defected on (TA,yA,x A) since Foreign tariﬀsa n dw o r l d
output structures do not react on the spot. The actual defection tariﬀ is deﬁned by
equation (8).
As shown above, for large β the solution to this problem is unconstrained and
consists of no political intervention at all. In the other extreme, if β =0 ,t h e
future is not valued at all and the outcome is a trade war as in section 2. For
any intermediate range of β, the self-enforcement constraint does bind and one can
formulate the following
Proposition 1 Any eﬃcient, symmetric, and self-enforcing trade agreement that
does not implement free trade includes positive import tariﬀs TA > 1 and positive




6The reason for this result is that small deviations of the policy functions around the Nash levels
have a ﬁrst-order impact on the cooperation utility but a second order eﬀect on the defection utility.
11Proof. Prove in a ﬁr s ts t e pt h a tt h eo p t i m a lt r a d ea g r e e m e n ti n c l u d e sTA > 1
and yA > 0, i.e. positive output of the import competing sector. Show in a second
step that positive subsidies to the import competing sector are needed to induce










uD − uN − 1
¸
while the arguments of the respective utilities are dropped. Notice that T = T∗ =




¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
TA=1
=0
and use (5), (6), and (8) to check
duD
dTA
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
TA=1
< 0
Together, both expressions imply
dL
dTA
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
TA=1
> 0.
whenever λ>0. Consequently, TA > 1 holds for the constrained solution of (15).













































12whenever λ>0. Consequently, yA > 0 holds for the constrained solution of (15).
Step 2. Check that TA,t h et a r i ﬀ prevailing in an optimal trade agreement satisﬁes


































The last equation holds by the optimality condition dL/dT A =0 .S i n c e t h e
duC/dT A < 0 and λ>0 this proves that dTA/dβ < 0. Finally, (13) requires
limβ→0(uD − uC)=0so that the optimal tariﬀ approaches the Nash level TN = b
as β → 0.T h u s , TA <bfor β ∈ (0,1). Since relative world price p =1in the
symmetric equilibrium, this implies that domestic relative import prices in Home
and Foreign are pHome,p Foreign <band by (4) all output in the import competing
sectors must be subsidized.
Figure 1 illustrates the ﬁnding of the proposition. On the horizontal axis the dis-
count factor β runs from zero to one. For large β, inequality (14) is satisﬁed and
free trade is sustainable. Consequently, no tariﬀsa r ec h a r g e da n dt h e r ei sn oi m p o r t
competing production under the optimal trade agreement. As soon as β drops be-
low the threshold in (14) the optimal trade agreement includes positive, subsidized
y-production. As the discount factor approaches zero, both countries ignore future
beneﬁts, and consequently the optimal trade policies (
_
y
A,TA)a p p r o a c ht h eN a s h
levels (10).
Proposition 1 shows that subsidies to import competing sectors are eﬃcient in re-
ducing defection incentives of foreign countries so subsidies are positive whenever
the SEC binds. For the intuition of this result assume that, say, Home does not
produce its import good y at all. As Foreign is the only supplier of the essential
y, Home strongly depends on Foreign’s supply and is willing to pay a ot for it so
that Foreign’s potential gains from defection are large. But even small amounts of
y-production in Home already break Foreign’s quasi-monopolistic position and sub-
stantially reduce its ability to extract output from Home. Thus, positive domestic
13Figure 1: Optimal Trade Agreement (Flexible Output)
production of the imported good is part of any trade agreement that does not imple-
ment free trade. — Taking this result for granted, one may ask further why domestic
markets fail to provide the quantity
_
y
A > 0 of the optimal trade agreement. A quick
look at relative prices answers this question. Under optimal tariﬀs, relative prices
for imported goods are too low to encourage domestic production. The very success
of trade agreements wipes out the market for domestic producers. Without subsi-
dies ﬁrms would make losses when providing the optimal level of import-competing
output that insures a country against foreign defection. Proﬁt-maximizers do not
incur such losses for the social beneﬁt of sustained cooperation. Consequently, the
government has to step in and subsidize import-competing production.
It is worth to dig a bit deeper into the intution of Proposition 1. From the govern-
ment’s perspective the incentive to set a unilaterally optimal tariﬀ can be decom-
posed in the following way. An authority that cares about domestic producers gains
but not about foreign consumers’ losses will try to replicate monopoly markups in
the export market and set tariﬀs to this end. According standard theory, monopoly
markups depend on the elasticity of demand σ through the factor 1/(σ − 1).S i n c e
Cobb-Douglas utility exhibits an elasticity of substitution of one, this translates into
14an inﬁnite markup. But by engaging in production of the import good, a country
increases its import elasticity and thereby reduces the markup dramatically (from
inﬁnity to a ﬁnite value). For this reason import competing production is extremely
eﬃcient in reducing the defection utility. This observation shows that the choice
of the utility is not innocent for the results but the general argument applies for
essential goods only.
Proposition 1 states that subsidies can be eﬃcient in reducing vulnerability to dicey
suppliers. Some aspects during and following the energy crisis of the 1970s can
be read in the light of that ﬁnding: when the OPEC imposed an embargo on
western industrialized countries, these latter spent a substantial amount of public
money to set up national energy programs. The stated aim of these programs
was to reach some degree of self-suﬃciency and reduce the vulnerability to the
countries that just had demonstrated their ability to collude to a cartel of suppliers.
More surprisingly, industrial countries continued and intensiﬁed these subsidies after
international oil prices dropped in the counter-oil shock 1986 (see Kohl (1991)). A
c o m m o no b j e c t i o nt os u c hp o l i t i c si st h a te n e r g yr e s e r v e sa r en o tt ob ed e p l e t e di n
times of low international prices but should rather be preserved for periods when
world markets are tighter. Yet, these strategies can be justiﬁes by Proposition 1.
As the model shows, subsidized energy production might precisely be the move
that prevents a renewed tightening of import supply by cutting the incentives of
oil-producers to collude. The key observation here is that supply shortages are
endogenous and can be prevented by artiﬁcial domestic competition. Thus, the
seemingly lobby-oriented policy may - in the light of Proposition 1 - eventually be
socially optimal.
Finally note that present paper’s model predicts that optimal protection is favoring
import-competing sectors. Rodrik (1995) identiﬁes an ”anti-trade bias” in trade
policy and convincingly argues that this observation contradicts the standard polit-
ical economy mechanisms (see Limao and Panagariya (2002) for a rare exceptions).
In contrast to existing literature, Proposition 1 suggests that this anti-trade bias
may be exactly what welfare maximizing governments do to make trade agreements
self-enforcing.
154 Dynamic Comparative Advantage
The present section analyzes how a deepening of the comparative advantage aﬀects
the cooperation incentives. As pointed out in connection with equation (14) in the
previous section, a more pronounced comparative advantage (a larger parameter
b)r a i s e st h ev a l u eo fc o o p e r a t i o nm o r et h a nt h ev a l u eo fd e f e c t i o na n dm a k e sf r e e
trade more likely. This section shows that a carving in of the comparative advantage
leads to gradual trade liberalization, in the process of which governments optimally
protect declining industries.
The comparative advantage is ﬁrst assumed to deepen exogenously through a single
a n t i c i p a t e dj u m pi np r o d u c t i v i t i e sb. This jump then leads to a gradual reduction
of trade barriers that sets in before the date of the technology change. Under the
optimal dynamic agreement the output of import-competing shrinks in that period.
In this sense, protection of declining industries is part of an optimal trade agree-
ment. The increase in the comparative advantage is then assumed to be generated
endogenously, stemming from a basic learning by doing process. In this way, the
results of this section integrate in and relate to the wider literature on learning
by doing and international trade (e.g. Krugman (1987), Young (1991), Devereux
(1997)).
In a repeated game where future gains form cooperation make players respect agree-
ments at present, all upcoming events enter the present self-enforcement constraint.
If for example some event increases gains from cooperation from next year on, to-
morrow’s cooperation will be deeper and more beneﬁcial. But these beneﬁts also
increase the present value of respecting the agreement which, in turn, relaxes the
present self-enforcement constraint and allows a partial improvement of cooperation
today already. As time goes by the increased future gains approach and cooperation
gradually improves. To explore this argument formally, assume that the productiv-
ity in the exporting sector, b, increases with a single exogenous jump at a future
date t0. This assumption is captured in the process of technologies
bt =
(
b if t < t0
¯ bi f t ≥ t0
(17)
with ¯ b>b> 1. Rational agents anticipate this jump. To save notation deﬁne the















Both expressions depend on the parameter b. The participation constraint at time














where time indices are now added to the policies of the trade agreement. Remem-
ber that an increase in b was shown to relax the static free trade self-enforcement
constraint (13). Consequently, one can assume that free trade is sustainable under








Further, as long as t0 is in the distant future, free trade can be assumed not to
be sustainable at t =0 . T h u s ,t h e r em u s tb eat i m et1 ≤ t0 so that free trade is





















S u p p o s ea g a i nt h a tc o u n t r i e sa l w a y si m p l e m e n tt h ee ﬃcient symmetric trade agree-
ment. This means that from time t1 onwards laisser-faire policies (T,y)=( 1 ,0)
prevail. At time t1 − 1, the optimal trade agreement maximizes cooperation utility














Note that by construction of t1 t h ec o n s t r a i n tm u s tb eb i n d i n gs ot h a tt h ev a l u e
function of this maximization problem is less than under laisser-faire, uC(1,0),a n d










The outcome of the maximization problem deliver the policy functions (TA
t1−1,yA
t1−1)
for time t1 −1.A tt i m et1 −2, governments take (TA
t1−1,yA
t1−1) as given to calculate














Note that by (19) the RHS of (20) is smaller than the RHS of (18) so the self-
enforcement constraint at time t1 − 2 (20) is tighter than at time t1 − 1 (18).
Consequently, the trade agreement at time t1 − 2( Tt1−2,y t1−2) is less liberal than
the one at t1 − 1 (Tt1−1,y t1−1). An induction argument completes the proof that,
starting from t1 and going backwards in time the trade agreement gets gradually
less liberal. This leads to the following
Proposition 2 An anticipated exogenous deepening of comparative advantage at
time to increases the anticipated gains from the trade agreement. Thereby, it relaxes
the self-enforcement constraint even before date to and consequently trade is liberal-
ized gradually. During the liberalization period declining industries are protected.
Proof. By (18), (20) and an induction argument, it remains to be shown that a
gradually relaxing SEC translates into a gradual reduction of traiﬀs and subsidies.


















Let the expression on the right be denoted with Bt. Bt is increasing in t.T h e


















t ;bt) ≤ Bt. (21)









t ;bt) − Bt =0 .






































where λt is the Lagrange multiplier of (21). Thus, TA
t is decreasing in time. The
proof that dyA
t /dBt < 0 for t<t 1 is identical.
The proposition has two parts, which address gradualism of trade liberalization
and the protection of declining sectors. While the ﬁnding of gradualism essentially
repeats the result of Devereux (1997), the novel part of Proposition 2 is the fact that
optimal trade agreements protect declining industries through tariﬀs and subsidies.
Figure 2 illustrates the dynamics. The jump of b allows for free trade after the date
to. The anticipated increase in the gains from cooperation allow trade liberalization
already before that date and, as the date to approaches, tariﬀs and subsidies are
slowly faded out.
The protection of declining industries is usually explained through political econ-
omy arguments (see Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Goldberg and Maggi (1999)
for prominent contributions). The contraction of an industry, a standard argument
runs, is followed by a decrease in lobbying activity, which in turn leads to less pro-
tection and further decline (see Hillman (1982), Cassing and Hillman (1986), and
Van Long and Vousden (1991)). In contrast, the present paper’s explanation relies
on purely welfare-maximizing governments and the reason for a stepwise reduction
of protection does not stem from the desire to cushion or reduce political resistance
but it is an optimal policy because. The self-enforcement constraint simply impedes
to let sectors did at once. Import competing sectors must be protected to the de-
gree that the self-enforcement constraint binds and as the latter stepwise relaxes,
industries gradually shrink and die.
A classical way to model a deepening of comparative advantage endogenously is via
learning by doing (see Krugman (1987), Young (1997), Devereux (1997)). The fol-
lowing lines will show that the process (17) can be generated by a standard learning
by doing process and thus relate the result of Proposition 2 to the literature on
learning by doing and international trade. Assume that in each sector there are two
technologies available, a basic and an advanced one. The advanced technology has
19Figure 2: Optimal Trade Agreement with Learning by Doing
20a lower unit labor requirement, yet it requires a minimum level of sector speciﬁc
knowledge κz (z = x,y) for production to take place. Denote that minimum knowl-
edge with the variable ¯ κz,w h e r ez indicates the sector. Then, Home’s productivity









¯ ai f κ y ≥ ¯ κy
1 else
where ¯ b>b> 1 and ¯ a>1. Productivity in Foreign depends on its sector-speciﬁc
knowledge in a symmetric way. Assume further that the sector-speciﬁcd i s e m b o d i e d









t + yt (22)
in Home and equivalently in Foreign. When Home and Foreign start with an initial
stock of knowledge κ
z,(∗)
0 (z ∈ {x,y}) satisfying the conditions
κ
x
0 − ¯ κ
x = κ
y,∗




0 − ¯ κ
y = κ
x,∗









the specialization pattern during a transition period of gradual trade liberalization
induce a faster growth of knowledge in the export sector. Thus, the advanced
technology of the export sector is adopted in both countries simultaneously and
before the date when adoption of the advanced technology in the import sector
is proﬁtable. In this way, learning by doing generates the process (17) with an
implicitly deﬁned date of complete trade liberalization t0.
The previous two sections made a strong case for the use of subsidies in trade
agreements, pointing out some beneﬁcial eﬀects it can have in a competitive world.
The results are in line with Bagwell and Staiger (2004) and (2006) who argue that the
banning of subsidies by the WTO "may ultimately do more harm than good to the
multilateral trading system". It is important, however, to stress the qualiﬁcations
of such reasoning. The next section will do so by highlighting the role of a ﬂexible
industrial structure.
215 Rigid Industrial Policy
As discussed above some necessary conditions need to be satisﬁed for the previous
sections’ results to go through. In particular, governments are required to heavily
discount future gains and import goods need to be essential. Apart from these
conditions another, less explicit, assumption turns out to be crucial. This additional
assumption concerns the ﬂexibility of industrial policies.
Up to this section, output patterns were assumed to be ﬂexible enough to change
from period to period. In particular, the time to change tariﬀs and subsidies was
assumed to be identical. According to the deﬁnition of the WTO (1995), however,
the term subsidy includes a wide range of governments’ activities including the
public provision of sector-speciﬁc inputs, the production of which needs time to
build, is long-lived, and subject to slow adjustment and changes. The present section
t h e r e f o r ed e a l sw i t ht h ec a s ew h e r et h et i m et oc h a n g eat a r i ﬀsi ss i g n i ﬁcantly shorter
than the horizon for changing an entire country’s output structure. It shows that
this change considerably qualiﬁe st h ep r e v i o u sr e s u l t s .
Assume in the following that governments have control over a perfectly divisible
resource whose amount is normalized to unity and which is a factor of production.
Allocation of the resource to one of the sectors makes it become a sector-speciﬁc
input good. This government input is essential in each industry but exhibits de-
creasing returns. Further, there is congestion in the use of this publicly provided
good, which leads to decreasing returns to labor on the sector level. Each govern-
ment distributes a fraction γ of it to the exporting and 1−γ to the importing sector.
The following production functions reﬂect these assumptions
x = b(γ/Lx)
αLx y =( ( 1− γ)/Ly)
αLy
for Home and the symmetric counterpart for Foreign. Let α ∈ (0,1) and b>1.
This keeps Home’s natural comparative advantage in good x. Atomistic workers
produce competitively taking overall productivities b(γ/Lx)α and ((1 − γ)/Ly)α as
given. Wage equalization leads to
Lx =
γ
γ +( 1− γ)(pT/b)1/α Ly =
(1 − γ)(pT/b)1/α




(γ +( 1− γ)(pT/b)1/α)1−α Ly =
(1 − γ)(pT/b)(1−α)/α
(γ +( 1− γ)(pT/b)1/α)1−α.
In the limit α → 1, output is equal to x = bγ and y =1− γ, which will be taken
as a benchmark here7. In addition, the parameter γ will be retricted to the interval
[0,1] to avoid a reversal of trade ﬂows.
Assume now that governments choose γ once and for all. The last sections’ strong
assumption that output structure can be changed every period is thus replaced by
the opposite assumption that industrial policy is entirely inﬂexible. Finally, when
governments choose their industrial policy γ this choice is assumed to be free from
commitment problems8. Thus, after the initial period, countries are only able to
defect on tariﬀs.
The eﬀect of introducing this additional rigidity can be read one more time from
the self-enforcement constraint (12). In particular, and in contrast to the previous
section’s setup, the initial choice of industrial policy now does aﬀect the utility
in future periods - in particular by an increase of the losses from a trade war.
When capacities to produce the imported good are set to zero, a trade war appears
especially grim. Consequently, countries have an excellent device to commit to free
trade by setting the industrial structure γ to zero and the deliberate creation of
mutual dependence constitutes a commitment-device for cooperation.
For a formal exposition of this idea, assume that the industrial structure γ is set at
the initial period and stays ﬁx forever. In the case of cooperation breakdown, both









Note that the punishment utility is zero at γ =0a n dt h a ti ti si n c r e a s i n gi nγ in
the range γ ∈ [0,1/2]. Clearly, when production of the imported good is zero for
7This limit case also represents a world in which ﬁrms cannot change output as fast as govern-
ments change tariﬀs. The general model with α ∈ (0,1) is numerically solvable and simulations
show that all qualitative results below go through.
8This assumption may seem inconsistent with the commitment problems from above. But one
can easily reconcile it with the general framework by assuming that all actions can be monitored
at positive a monitoring cost. Under the adequate monitoring cost, incurring it only once at the
start of the trade agreement is rational, while paying it every period is not.
9Use the symmetric tariﬀs (9) and utility (5) with p =1 .
23all future periods, a trade war leads to zero utility - which is in fact worse than the
Nash utility under ﬂexible output patterns (11) (uN >u P =0 ). Consequently, the
self-enforcement constraint (12) for free trade, which now becomes
β ≥
uD − uC






is less demanding than the one under ﬂexible output patters (14). The direct con-
sequence of this observation is
Proposition 3 Other things equal, free trade is more likely to be self-enforceable in
a world with rigid output than with ﬂexible one.
This result applies when output capacities are suﬃciently slow to build. The creation
of mutual dependence can serve as a commitment device and can make free trade
sustainable when it would not be under more ﬂexible output patterns. In this
sense the deliberate destruction of capacities in import competing sectors may be
an adequate policy by generating this dependency. But can a sovereign country
be expected to deliberately enter dependence to other nations? Indeed, this is
a standard interpretation of what occurred with the foundation of the European
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the cooperation that laid the basis of what
later became the European Union. The pooling of essential goods (steel, coal,
and, to some extend, wheat) was meant to create a mutual dependence between
the six western European member nations and aimed to make future cooperation
indispensable (see Gillingham (1991)).
The proposition illustrates the beneﬁcial implications of impeding subsidies under
rigid output structure for the case where countries are patient and satisfy conditions
(24). This result, however, leaves open whether and how subsidies are employed
when the self-enforcement constraint binds, which is the case analyzed in the re-
mainder of the section. In particular, it will be shown that Proposition 1 does not
generalize to this case and that eﬃcient trade agreements do not always implement
positive subsidies for the following reason. Small amounts of domestic production of
the essential imported good make a trade war less threatening as can be read from
(23). Intuitively, when the adequate production capacities are at hand, an upcom-
ing trade war does not seem too grim and hence the value of defection increases, so
that import competing production tends to tighten the self-enforcement constraint.
24This mechanism remarkably opposes the ﬁnding from Proposition 1, where subsidies
unambiguously relaxed the self-enforcement constraint. Obviously, the eﬀects which
relax the constraint and drive Proposition 1 are still be present. It can be shown,
however, that at the margin the negative eﬀect prevails and small amounts of import
competing production unambiguously tighten the self-enforcement constraint. The
consequence is the following
Proposition 4 Under rigid output patterns, small amounts of industrial policy fa-
voring the import competing sector unambiguously tighten the self-enforcement con-
straint. Consequently the optimal trade agreement either employs industrial policy
in large amounts or not at all.






























(see (16)), duP/dyA increase at a higher order than duD/dyA decreases. This implies
that the associated Lagrange function has the derivative
dL
dyA













¶¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
yA=0
=+ ∞
whenever λ>0 and proves the statement.
Figure 3 illustrates the ﬁnding of the proposition. There are now three diﬀerent
ranges for the discount factor. At high levels of β the economy is undistorted under
the optimal agreement. For intermediate values, free trade is not sustainable but
only a moderate relaxation of the self-enforcement constraint (12) is required; for
these small relaxations a promotion of the import-competing sectors is inadequate
since it optimally is either zero or big time. Consequently, the optimal trade agree-
ment imposes positive tariﬀ but zero subsidies. For the value of β still lower positive
tariﬀs are not enough to make a trade agreement self-enforceable and both, tariﬀs
and industrial policy, are employed in positive quantities.
25Figure 3: Optimal Trade Agreement (Rigid Output)
It is worth noticing that the disciplinary forces in Propositions 1 and 4 are quite
distinct. When commercial and industrial policies are equally quick to change,
stimulating small quantities of domestic production of the imported good reduce
the foreign country’s incentives to defect on the agreement. In the case of more
rigid output patterns, the commitment device aims to tie the hands of the domestic
government and is directed against the domestic government’s defection incentives.
The two eﬀects highlight the fact that to sustain trade agreements, at least one
of the two is needed: one-time defection must appear little attractive or future
consequences of defection quite severe.
Before closing the analysis of the rigid output assumption it is worth asking which
of the model’s predictions apply in the intermediate case where output patterns are
neither completely rigid nor entirely ﬂexible. To this aim consider the case between
ﬂexible and rigid production. Assume that after defection on tariﬀs, H periods are
required to adapt industrial policy to the new uncooperative environment. In this































The LHS of (25) tightens with increasing H, varying between (13) and (24) when
H ∈ {1,2,...}. It is further apparent that Proposition 3 still goes through in this
somewhat less rigid world: cooperation on free trade is more likely under more
rigid output patterns. It is equally quick to check that Proposition 4 still goes
through in the somewhat less rigid world. Starting from zero, small increases in y
unambiguously tighten the self-enforcement constraint and hinder cooperation.
In this sense, the results of Propositions 3 and 4 are, compared with those in Propo-
sition 1, the more robust ones.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has argued that in a world where governments maximize social welfare
the use of industrial policy can be part of the optimal strategy to make interna-
tional trade agreements self-enforcing. Optimal interventions must favor compara-
tively disadvantaged, import-competing sectors The distortions the interventionist
policies create are the price that must be paid to prevent severer damage from a
trade war. Preconditions for these results are low elasticities of demand of the
import-goods, strong discounting of future beneﬁts, and ﬂexibility in the indus-
trial structure of countries. A dynamic extension of the model has introduced a
simple learning by doing process and provided a rationale for subsidizing declining
industries. A second extension has illustrated the limitations of the argument by
emphasizing the role of the ﬂexible industrial structure. When output patterns are
slow to change, mutual dependence can serve as a commitment device, encouraging
adherence to an agreement. In this case the stimulation of import competing sec-
tors may even undermine trade agreements and the deliberate creation of mutual
dependence through a policy that acts against import-competing sectors fosters free
trade.
27Appendix
Computation of the One-Period Nash Equilibrium. The program is to max-
imize (5) over T, ¯ x and ¯ y s.t. (4) and (6). The proof proceeds in two steps. The
ﬁrst step disregards (4) and assumes that Home’s choice variables are T, x and y
(ﬁxing the actual output instead of the minimum levels ¯ x and ¯ y). The second step
shows that the original problem has the same solution.












s.t. (6) and x = b(1 − y) (A1)






















x∗T∗(T +1 )+x(T∗ +1 )
−
y(T∗ +1 )+y∗
yT(T∗ +1 )+y∗(T +1 )
(A2)








x∗ + x(1 + 1/T ∗)
y∗ + y(T∗ +1 )
(A3)
Whatever the best strategy on the output may be, (A3) establishes the unique
best response tariﬀ.N o t et h a tt h et a r i ﬀ of a symmetric Nash equilibrium must be
T =
p
x/y. Note also that (A3) reduces the two-dimensional maximization problem
to a one-dimensional when maximizing the utility u(y,x∗,TBR(y,x∗,T∗),T∗) over
y. To derive the optimal output (y,x), use x = b(1 − y) and the envelope theorem


















x∗T∗(T +1 )+x(T∗ +1 )
−
T(T∗ +1 )
yT(T∗ +1 )+y∗(T +1 )
(A5)
28Equations (A4) and (A5) imply that if a symmetric equilibrium (with y = x∗,




















N = b (A6)
To complete the proof that (A6) in fact describes a Nash Equilibrium, set Foreign
variables according to (A6) (T∗ = b and x∗ =1 /(b+1)) and show that (A4) and (A5)
imply yN =1 /(b+1)and TN = b.T h i si sd o n eb yu s i n gT∗ = b and x∗ =1 /(b+1)




1+( 1− y)(b +1 ) 2
b2 + y(b +1 ) 2 (A7)
Write further the short-hand p = r1/r2 with











Combining (A5) with the optimality condition (A4) leads to












Now, TBR from (A7) is decreasing in y so that the price (6) satisﬁes dp/dy =
∂p/∂y+(∂p/∂T)(dT BR/dy) < 0 and is decreasing in y as well. Thus, the expression
o nt h el e f ti si n c r e a s i n gi ny. Further, the expression in the square brackets on the
















TBR+1(b +1 ) 2
to see with dTBR/dy < 0 that the ﬁrst term is decreasing and the second term is
increasing in y. Thus, the expression in the slanted brackets on the right of (A8)
is decreasing in y and so is the whole right hand side of (A8). There is hence an
unique solution to (A8), which is the symmetric one from (A6).
29Second step. The choice variables are now tariﬀsa n dminimum levels of output in
the sectors (¯ x and ¯ y). It remains to show that internalizing (4) in the optimization
program renders the Nash strategies (10). To this aim set (T∗, ¯ x∗, ¯ y∗)=( b,1/(b +
1),0) and show that Home does not gain from a deviation form (10).
By the restriction x∗ ≥ ¯ x∗ there are two possible cases: x∗ =¯ x∗ or x∗ > ¯ x∗.I n
the case x∗ =¯ x∗ Home’s best response induce the quantities (A6) and are thus
(10). In the case x∗ > ¯ x∗ optimal production of Foreign ﬁrms implies T∗p = b or
simply p =1 . With equation (6) and the resource constraints x = b(1 − y) and
y∗ = b(1 − x∗) this leads to
2b(T +1 ) x
∗ = y(T + b)(b +1 )+b(T − b) (A9)
Equation (A9) shows that an increase in x∗ i m p l i e sa ni n c r e a s eo ny or in T.( T os e e
t h el a t t e rs t a t e m e n tr e w r i t e( A 9 )a s2bx∗ =[ y(T + b)(b +1 )+b(T − b)]/(T+1)and
notice that the right hand expression is increasing in T when the constraint y ≤ 1
applies.) Finally, p =1and (5) imply that utility
u =( b(1 − y)+y)
√
T/(T +1 )
is decreasing in y and T.T h u s ,u is maximized at minimal y and T and hence,
by (A9), at minimal x∗. This implies that the Nash equilibrium does not involve
strategies inducing x∗ > ¯ x∗. Thus, (10) characterizes the Nash equilibrium.
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